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FAIRNESS, CONSENSUS, AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
IDEAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 
Philip Cook 
 
Final Pre-Publication Draft 
 
Published Version appears as 'Fairness, Consensus, and the Justification of the Ideal 
Liberal Constitution’ Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 22 (1), 2009, pp. 165-186. 
 
Introduction 
In Constitutional Goods,1 Alan Brudner seeks to articulate a novel conception of justice that 
will inform the content of the ideal liberal constitution. The content and justification of 
this conception of justice are the topics of this paper. The content of this novel 
conception of justice is constituted by what Brudner describes as an inclusive conception 
of liberalism, and its justification is grounded on an account of public reason that is 
presented in opposition to Rawls’s. I will argue that we should reject both the content 
and justification of Brudner’s conception of justice. In sum, I will argue that Brudner 
cannot construct an inclusive conception of liberalism from elements of libertarianism, 
egalitarianism, and communitarianism, and that his account of public reason lacks the 
properties of fairness and reciprocity that differentiate a reasonable agreement from a 
modus vivendi. This paper therefore seeks to defend a Rawlsian political conception justice 
and justification from Brudner’s criticisms and proposed alternatives.  
Constitutional Goods is a work of great breadth and depth, and deserves careful 
consideration from political philosophers for its many original and controversial 
                                                 
Thanks to participants at the LSE Forum in Legal and Political Theory Symposium for 
comments and contributions on an earlier draft, and in particular to Alan Brudner for his 
generous and comprehensive contributions at the symposium. 
1 Alan Brudner, Constitutional Goods (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 
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arguments regarding the ideal liberal constitution. I leave open the question of whether 
Brudner’s ideal liberal constitution and its goods should be endorsed by liberals, and 
whether the more Rawlsian political conception of justice and justification I defend here 
could harmonise with this constitution. However, is seems to me that Brudner’s inclusive 
conception of liberalism and his account of public reason pose significant challenges to 
political liberals, challenges which I believe it is important to meet. 
The paper begins with a brief description of Brudner’s account of the inclusive 
conception of liberalism, and then in sections two and three sets out Brudner’s criticisms 
of Rawls’s political liberalism and his alternative account of public reason respectively. In 
section four I consider Brudner’s rejection of Rawls’s distinction between political and 
comprehensive doctrines, and argue that either the various liberal paradigms as described 
by Brudner are political doctrines, in which case his too is a political conception of 
justice, or they are comprehensive and he fails to address the problem of reasonable 
pluralism. In section five I address Brudner’s proposal of a convergent consensus in 
place of an overlapping consensus, and argue that a convergent consensus is improbable 
on the terms he sets out. In section six I argue that even if my objections can be met, any 
consensus on Brudner’s terms would fail to include elements of fairness that distinguish 
a reasonable agreement from a modus vivendi. I conclude that Brudner’s conception of 
justice and justification suffers from internal problems combined with properties that 
make it unattractive from a liberal point of view. 
1. Paradigms of the Liberal Confidence and the Inclusive Conception 
One of the most impressive features of Constitutional Goods is its attempt to provide a 
justification of the ideal liberal constitution that embraces all views that share in ‘the 
liberal confidence.’2 The liberal confidence involves three commitments: firstly, that the 
                                                 
2 ibid. at 13-15 
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individual human agent is of final value, and that this value is indefeasible by any other 
value or purpose; secondly, that the value of the human agent is intrinsic, and not 
derived from membership of a group or participation in a culture; and thirdly, that the 
value of the human agent creates inviolable constraints on the permissibility of 
subordinating the agent’s ends to those of other individuals or entities such as states or 
nations. Brudner argues that the liberal confidence is shared by a wide range of liberal 
paradigms, including the libertarianism of Hayek and Nozick, the egalitarianism of Rawls 
and Dworkin, the communitarianism of Taylor and Sandel, and the perfectionism of 
Finnis and MacIntyre.3 Whilst this liberal confidence is shared by a broad range of liberal 
paradigms, Brudner argues that the egalitarian paradigm has become the dominant liberal 
conception of justice in terms of which contemporary liberal constitutionalism is justified 
in both theory and practice. Brudner argues that the liberal egalitarian conception of 
justice is at once too partisan and too thin to provide an adequate foundation for the 
ideal liberal constitution. It is too partisan because the other liberal paradigms that share 
the liberal confidence are excluded from the framework of justification of the liberal 
constitution as the justification draws on values they do not endorse. Consequently, the 
legitimacy of a liberal egalitarian constitution is compromised by its exclusion of all other 
liberal paradigms that are denied the scope to assent to its authority. The liberal 
egalitarian constitution is too thin because its prioritisation of the right over the good 
prevents it from recognising that certain goods can trump basic liberal egalitarian rights 
in a manner entirely consistent with the liberal confidence. Brudner argues that trumping 
goods such as marriage, religious practice, and membership of corporations, are 
necessary to the flourishing of an ideal liberal polity, and are in fact becoming recognised 
                                                 
3 ibid. at ix.  
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as such in existing constitutional practice in various liberal regimes.4 As a partisan version 
of liberalism that dogmatically prioritises the right over the good, the egalitarian 
constitution is unable to provide a normative justification of current liberal constitutional 
practice, and to provide a basis for a flourishing liberal polity.  
 Whist Brudner believes that current theoretical and constitutional practice is 
deficient because of its commitment to egalitarianism at the expense of other liberal 
paradigms, his complaint is less with egalitarianism than with the idea that any particular 
paradigm of liberalism can provide the basis for a stable and legitimate liberal polity. A 
libertarian constitution or communitarian constitution would suffer from the same 
problem of partiality as does the egalitarian constitution. Brudner consequently argues 
that the basis of the justification of the ideal liberal constitution must be wrought on 
entirely different grounds than offered hitherto. He begins the presentation of his 
alternative with a diagnosis of the problems with Rawls’s version presented in Political 
Liberalism and subsequent works.5  
2. Brudner’s Complaint with Rawls’s Political Liberalism 
On Rawls’s view, citizens exercising their theoretical and practical reason freely in a 
liberal polity will develop divergent comprehensive doctrines on important moral, 
religious, and philosophical questions. The stability and legitimacy of a well-ordered 
liberal society relies on the possibility of finding grounds for the public justification of a 
political conception of justice6 that appeals to shared political values, rather than 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines, and this in turn relies on the reasonableness of 
                                                 
4 Brudner points to the examples of the constitutions of Canada, South Africa, and Germany, 
ibid. at 21. 
5 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), John Rawls, 
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (1997) 64 The University of Chicago Law Review 765-
807, John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001) 
6 A political conception of justice is a moral conception of justice that applies to the fundamental 
economic, democratic, and legal institutions of society that comprise the basic structure. 
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citizens. Reasonable citizens are those who are motivated to agree to terms of social 
cooperation that are acceptable to others in society who are similarly motivated, and who 
accept the burdens of judgment on the justification of a public conception of justice. 
Citizens who accept the burdens of judgment acknowledge that theoretical and practical 
reasoning are limited by such conditions as lack of perfect information, the fuzziness of 
many theoretical and practical concepts, the affect of personal experience on the 
evaluation of evidence, and natural differences in importance individuals attach to 
various goals. Given that the conception of justice governs those institutions that have a 
fundamental and pervasive effect on society, and given that this effect is enforced 
through the coercive power of the state, Rawls argues that the justification of the 
conception of justice must be grounded on values and norms of reasoning that are 
publicly accessible and endorsed by all reasonable citizens. Thus, esoteric arguments and 
theories, convoluted modes of argumentation, and controversial evidence are 
unacceptable sources for a public justification. Public justification requires public reason, 
which appeals to common sense, accepted evidence, and shared norms of argumentation. 
Rawls argues that through the exercise of public reason, reasonable citizens will seek an 
overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice that governs the basic 
structure of society. The overlapping consensus will refer to the principles for the 
distribution of primary goods, and their justifying reasons. Reasonable citizens will 
endorse the overlapping consensus for reasons coherent with their own comprehensive 
doctrines, but this endorsement must also cohere with public reason. Its coherence with 
public reason allows such a justification of a political conception of justice to be 
freestanding, as it relies on no particular comprehensive doctrine. Thus Rawls argues that 
a freestanding political conception of justice can be justified on grounds of public reason 
to all reasonable citizens who are members of a liberal polity that is marked by 
permanent reasonable pluralism.  
 6 
 In common with Rawls, Brudner seems to accept that it is quite natural for a 
liberal society to be composed of a plurality of divergent doctrines that hold differing 
views on important matters of philosophy, ethics, and religion. We encountered such a 
plurality in the earlier description of the variety of liberal paradigms present in theory and 
practice of liberal politics. However, Brudner rejects Rawls’s notion of a public 
justification of an overlapping consensus on a freestanding political conception of justice. 
Brunder’s objections focus on Rawls’s notions of a freestanding conception of justice, 
the overlapping consensus, and the burdens of judgment.  
a) Freestanding Conception of Justice 
Brudner argues that Rawls’s notion of a freestanding conception of justice results from 
an undue pessimism about the possibility of finding a basis for the public justification of 
a conception of justice on terms internal to the various liberal paradigms. Any attempt at 
public justification that fails to provide reasons that can be endorsed from within the 
differing liberal paradigms will fail, because the supposed freestanding conception will 
necessarily be either too empty and formal to provide substance to the conception of 
justice, or too thick and partisan to provide a shared basis for acceptance. In other 
words, if truly freestanding from any of the reasons and values that give substance to the 
various liberal paradigms, a political conception of justice will be unable to provide 
content to the important political rights and principles of an ideal liberal constitution. 
How are property rights to be conceived without a substantive conception of entitlement 
to property, the conditions of transfer, and the basis for contract and labour? However, 
Brudner argues that any substantive account of these or any other rights will necessarily 
be derived from a particular version of the liberal confidence that will be unacceptable to 
the other paradigms. Such substance will be necessarily partisan, on Brudner’s view, 
because Rawls has disavowed the possibility of a substantive political conception of 
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justice that includes essential elements of each liberal paradigm in favour of a conception 
that is freestanding of any particular liberal doctrines. These problems of the formality 
and partiality of the freestanding political conception of justice threaten the stability and 
legitimacy of a liberal polity. 
b) Overlapping Consensus 
For Rawls, the agreement characterised by an overlapping consensus on a freestanding 
political conception of justice differs markedly from a modus vivendi. A modus vivendi is 
agreement contingent on the self-interest of the citizens justified from the point of view 
of their comprehensive doctrines. The overlapping consensus, on the other hand, is 
agreement motivated by reasonableness rather than self-interest. For Rawls, to be 
motivated by reasonableness means to be motivated to seek agreement according to 
reasons and values that are mutually authoritative to all other reasonable persons. These 
reasons and values are therefore shared, and as such are neither self-interested nor 
altruistic. They are not self-interested because they do not refer to reasons and values 
that are grounded in a person’s particular goals and motivations, and they are not 
altruistic because they do not assume a sacrifice or negation of self-interest as the basis 
for agreement. But Brudner argues that the overlapping consensus must collapse into a 
modus vivendi. It collapses because ‘…the reasons supporting the consensus are external to 
the conception of public reason that generated the principles in the first place, [and] it 
will be a sheer accident if all the principles are derivable from a particular philosophic 
view, or congruent with it, or compatible with it.’7 I understand Brudner’s point to be 
that as the political conception of justice is freestanding, all justifications of it are 
independent of each liberal paradigm, and therefore any overlap between liberal 
paradigms and the conception will be ad hoc. Consequently, any consensus will not be 
                                                 
7 Alan Brudner, Constitutional Goods at 19 
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on the basis of reasonableness but on an accidental coincidence between the partisan 
interests of a particular liberal paradigm and the political conception of justice. 
Therefore, the distinction between an overlapping consensus and modus vivendi will 
evaporate. 
c) Burdens of Judgment 
We recall that for Rawls a reasonable citizen is committed to seek terms of agreement 
that are neither self-interested nor altruistic but mutually authoritative, and who also 
recognises the burdens of judgment. Having rejected Rawls’s arguments for an 
overlapping consensus derived from the motivation to seek reasonable agreement, 
Brudner also rejects Rawls’s view that the burdens of judgment constrain and constitute 
public justification. Brudner argues that Rawls’s commitment to the burdens of judgment 
is derived from a view of judgment where there is an inevitable indeterminacy between a 
concept and its application.8 This indeterminacy is the product of two phenomena: 
firstly, that individuals are inevitably imperfectly informed, influenced by subjective 
experience and disposition, and naturally weigh evidence and outcomes differently; 
secondly, indeterminacy is the product of the nature of the faculty of judgment itself, 
where there is no higher-order rule for the application of rules to particular cases, as this 
leads to an infinite regress in rules of application. However, Brudner points out that this 
view of judgment as riven by indeterminacy is merely one conception. Brudner seems to 
accept that certain kinds of judgment are characterised by such indeterminacy, but offers 
an alternative notion of judgment appropriate to public reasoning. This alternative 
notion of judgment is characterised by a comparison of the conception of justice 
endorsed by a particular liberal paradigm (such as libertarianism, egalitarianism, and 
communitarianism) with an account of political authority that would exist in a society 
                                                 
8 ibid. at 432. 
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that fully realised the particular liberal paradigm’s conception justice. For example, we 
identify the integral features of an egalitarian conception of justice, which according to 
Brudner are the principles of luck egalitarianism. We then imagine a society and its 
constitution that fully realised the egalitarian conception of justice. Brudner argues that 
such a society and its constitution would fail to fully protect the rights of individuals and 
promote goods necessary to the fulfilment of an egalitarian society. This process of 
comparison of the conception of justice and its full realisation in a political society leads 
to an identification of the contradictions and omissions in each liberal paradigm that are 
addressed by properties of the other liberal paradigms. The outcome of this process of 
public reasoning freed from the burdens of judgment is Brudner’s key idea of the 
inclusive conception of liberalism: a conception of justice that is not freestanding but 
rather constituted by particular features of each liberal paradigm that together offer a full 
conception of justice that each can endorse on its own terms and which consequently 
receives unanimous consent. We will say more about Brudner’s inclusive conception of 
liberalism and his proposed method of justification presently, but for the moment it is 
sufficient to note that Brudner’s objection to Rawls’s notion of the burden’s of judgment 
is not that it is flawed or mistaken, but rather that it is inappropriate to public reasoning 
and inferior to his proposed alternative. 
Brudner therefore argues that there are good reasons to doubt that Rawls’s 
notion of a public justification in the form of an overlapping consensus on a freestanding 
political conception of justice will provide a basis for the justification of an ideal liberal 
constitution. On Brudner’s view, the stability and legitimacy of the ideal liberal 
constitution does rely on a public justification, but he presents a novel alternative to 
Rawls’s version. This is his notion of a convergent consensus on an inclusive conception 
of liberalism. 
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3. The Convergent Consensus on the Inclusive Conception of Liberalism 
We saw that Brudner criticises Rawls’s notion of an overlapping consensus as inevitably 
collapsing into a modus vivendi. Brudner believes that a stable principled justification of the 
ideal liberal constitution must include essential elements of the differing conceptions of 
justice of each liberal paradigm. One of the fascinating aspects of Constitutional Goods is 
Brudner’s development of the inclusive conception of liberalism from the three main 
liberal paradigms. Through historical and philosophical analysis, Brudner presents an 
account of how each liberal paradigm develops its core moral and political commitments, 
and how both in theory and practice each paradigm proves incomplete without the 
contribution of elements of the others. In the broadest outline, Brudner argues that the 
problem of legitimate political authority raised by the decline of deference to the received 
authority of monarchs and churches led to the development of the libertarian 
commitment to the intrinsic value of individuals and the rights that protect that 
individual and their choices. Thus the foundation stone of liberalism was laid, and 
authority is associated with consent. However, Brudner argues that the libertarian 
paradigm cannot fulfil its own ambitions of providing a full account of legitimate 
authority. Whilst legitimacy is associated with consent, the libertarian conception of 
choice omits an account of the quality of that choice. Is the choice free from 
manipulation, adequately resourced, and likely to be fulfilled? Brudner argues that the 
libertarian paradigm does not have the conceptual resources to provide answers to these 
questions, and so whilst its commitment to the relationship between the value of 
individual choice and legitimacy is retained, the conception of justice which fully 
accounts for legitimacy and stability requires augmentation. This augmentation is 
provided by the egalitarian paradigm which seeks to answer the questions of the quality 
of choice with an account of the distribution of goods necessary to allow all individuals 
effective choice and therefore to be able to provide consent. Thus, the egalitarian 
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paradigm enriches the account of the necessary context and conditions for the possibility 
of autonomous choice for each individual. In particular, the egalitarian paradigm 
provides the key conceptual distinction between choice and chance, upon which 
decisions of just distribution are made.9 However, Brudner argues that the account of 
choice that gives substance to the notion of legitimate authority also requires an answer 
to what ends the choices of individuals should aim at, how these personal ends should be 
related to the ends of the society in which individuals live, and how the value of these 
ends should be weighted against the value of the rights of the individuals to choose 
them. The answers to these questions are found in the communitarian paradigm of 
liberalism, which explains why institutions such as family, community, polity, and the 
components of these such as marriage and membership of corporations are of moral and 
political value. These goods are a necessary condition for the possibility of a community 
of individuals who are able to exercise free choice and therefore express consent. The 
full account of the conception of justice that provides the basis for legitimate authority 
must therefore include elements of each liberal paradigm in an inclusive conception of 
liberalism. The ideal liberal constitution enumerates the rights and goods necessary to the 
flourishing of the ideal liberal polity, and the core goods of the communitarian paradigm 
may trump certain of the individual rights when their preservation and promotion is 
required to secure the basis for free individual choice and consent. Thus, the ideal liberal 
constitution embodies a balance of reciprocally related rights and goods, which are in a 
dynamic relationship of priority, which Brudner describes as sequential rather than 
lexical.10  
                                                 
9 Brudner has in mind luck egalitarian variant of egalitarianism. See Brudner, Constitutional Goods 
at 254-276 
10 ibid. at 22. 
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 Brudner argues that this inclusive conception of liberalism can provide a 
convergent rather than an overlapping consensus. We recall that Rawls’s overlapping 
consensus was characterised by principled reasonable agreement on the freestanding 
conception of justice. Rawls argues that reasonable individuals will affirm both the 
freestanding political conception of justice and their particular comprehensive doctrines. 
Some highly systematic comprehensive views will include the political conception in their 
framework of reasons and values, but it is not a requirement that comprehensive 
doctrines integrate the political conception of justice into their comprehensive doctrine. 
Indeed, one of the main goals of Rawls’s argument is to show that the political 
conception of justice has reasons and values of its own that provide sources of 
justification freestanding of any particular comprehensive doctrine. Thus, the 
agreement/justification reached on the political conception of justice will overlap all 
those citizens and their comprehensive doctrines that affirm the freestanding political 
conception of justice on reasonable grounds. We saw that Brudner argues that this will 
fail to provide a principled reasonable agreement and will collapse into a modus vivendi 
because the various reasonable comprehensive doctrines will (mostly) not endorse the 
political conception of justice for reasons internal to their systems of beliefs and values, 
and this lack of grounding in the comprehensive doctrines will lead to an ad hoc 
consensus that will fail to provide stability and legitimacy. In order to provide for the 
stability and legitimacy required of a full account of the justification of the political 
conception of justice, Brudner argues that the agreement of all reasonable 
comprehensive views (which for him would be members of the family of one of the 
liberal paradigms) must be internal to their framework of reasons and values. In other 
words, the political conception of justice is justified to libertarians because it protects the 
individual’s rights that libertarianism contributes to the inclusive conception; it is justified 
to egalitarians because it provides for the distribution of social goods; and it is justified to 
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the communitarian because it promotes the goods necessary to the reciprocal flourishing 
of individuals and society in the dialogic community. Therefore, the justification of the 
ideal liberal constitution is the result of a convergence of the differing paradigms of 
liberalism. This consensus converges on the inclusive conception which is not 
freestanding of any of these particular liberal paradigms, but is rather constituted by a 
combination of elements of each. This, Brudner argues, addresses the problems he raised 
with Rawls’s argument for an overlapping consensus on a freestanding political 
conception of justice, as it provides for a principled agreement from within each liberal 
paradigm that is acceptable to all from with their particular doctrines. Thus, Brudner 
argues that the convergent consensus on the inclusive conception of liberalism is the 
most appropriate basis for the stability and legitimacy of the ideal liberal constitution. 
 Having outlined Brudner’s approach to the justification of the ideal liberal 
constitution, and his differences with Rawls, we will now consider whether it does 
provide a more appropriate basis for the justification of the ideal liberal constitution. We 
will first examine Brudner’s portrayal of the liberal paradigms, we will then assess the 
convergent consensus on the inclusive conception, and finally ask whether Brudner’s 
view can provide the basis for a principled agreement on the ideal liberal constitution.  
4. The Portrayal of the Liberal Paradigms  
We recall that one of the motivations for Constitutional Goods is to set out an account of 
the justification of a political conception of justice that is neither too formal nor too 
partisan. To achieve this Brudner seeks to show how the different paradigms of the 
liberal confidence can find agreement from within the framework of their own reasons 
and values. This agreement forms the convergent consensus on the inclusive conception 
of liberalism. As the convergent consensus of the inclusive conception provides the basis 
for the justification of the ideal liberal constitution, the content of the member 
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paradigms is crucially important as these, in combination, constitute the inclusive 
conception. Therefore, Brudner’s portrayal of these member paradigms matters greatly 
to the justification of the ideal liberal constitution. However, it seems to me that the 
portrayal of the liberal paradigms is problematic on two counts. Firstly, Brudner’s 
description of the content of each paradigm is partial and fails to recognise the complex 
and contradictory relationship between differing positions with libertarianiam, 
egalitarianism, and communitarianism. Secondly, if liberal paradigms do not exist in the 
manner suggested by Brudner’s portrayal, the notions of the convergent consensus on 
the inclusive conception, and the subsequent constitutional goods, seem threatened. 
a) The Competing and Contradictory Nature of the Liberal Paradigms 
Brudner’s portrayal of each liberal paradigm is controversial to members of each 
paradigm. Take the example of the egalitarian paradigm. Brudner’s account of the 
egalitarian paradigm is based on the assumption that egalitarianism is concerned to 
distinguish choice from chance, and allocate responsibility and resources on the basis of 
compensating for disadvantages that are the result of bad luck. Only inequalities that are 
the result of an individual’s choices may be allowed. This is the luck egalitarian 
conception of egalitarian.  
One minor objection is to the association of both Dworkin and Rawls with this 
conception of egalitarianism. As I understand Dworkin’s work on equality, it is 
motivated by Rawls’s underdeveloped account of the affect of different kinds of luck on 
distributions. To state the difference, take two cases. In case A, Jenny is born with a 
severe disability that prevents her from earning a living, whilst Johnny is born healthy 
and clever and develops a successful career. In case B, Jenny and Johnny are born with 
equal talents and resources. Jenny squanders her talents and resources and ends up poor, 
whilst Johnny works hard, chooses wisely, and ends up wealthy.  Rawls would argue that 
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unless the inequalities were to the benefit of Jenny in both cases (and let’s assume for 
this argument that they are not), then both unequal distributions are unjustified and 
should be corrected. Dworkin on the other hand wishes to draw a distinction between 
unchosen bad luck, and chosen bad luck.11 This distinction is expressed in his account of 
brute luck and option luck. Dworkin would argue that an egalitarian society would find 
case A impermissible, and case B permissible. Therefore, it seems important to 
distinguish both Dworkin and Rawls’s view of the relationship between choice and 
chance and egalitarianism. Whilst this is, in one respect, a minor interpretative point 
regarding varieties of egalitarianism, it points to a much more significant problem with 
Brudner’s portrayal of the egalitarian paradigm. 
Brudner describes the egalitarian paradigm as equivalent to luck egalitarianism. 
However, luck egalitarianism is not equivalent to liberal egalitarianism. The debate about 
the nature and value of equality admits of no consensus. The debates between supporters 
of sufficiency,12 priority,13 luck egalitarianism,14 and strict egalitarianism15 would each 
contend that they best account for egalitarianism. Moreover, many of these views are 
mutually exclusive: for example strict egalitarianism excludes the kinds of inequalities 
allowed by prioritarianism and luck egalitarianism. Brudner might respond that not all of 
these views are properly described as egalitarian (for example prioritarianism or 
sufficiency), and he is only concerned with the essential commitments of the egalitarian 
                                                 
11 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’ (1981) 10 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs at 283-345 
12 for example see Elizabeth Anderson ‘What is the Point of Equality?’ (1999) 109 Ethics 287-
337, and Harry Frankfurt ‘Equality as a Moral Ideal’ (1987) 98 Ethics 21-43 
13 for example Thomas Nagel, Equality and Priority (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991) 
14 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
and G. A. Cohen, If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2000) 
15 Larry Temkin, Inequality, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Larry Temkin, 
‘Harmful Goods, Harmless Bads’, in R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris (eds.), Value, 
Welfare, and Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)  
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paradigm as it features in a development of the inclusive conception. But if Brudner is 
concerned to identify the essential commitments of the egalitarian paradigm, the closest 
fit would be Temkin’s strict egalitarianism. Temkin’s is perhaps the purest egalitarianism 
because it focuses on the value of equality as the comparative standing of agents and 
denies that the levelling down objection negates this value. It seems unlikely that luck 
egalitarianism could provide the basis for an account of the egalitarian paradigm, as luck 
egalitarianism is only one partial view within this complex debate. The same problem 
attaches to the libertarian paradigm. Perhaps Nozick and Hayek would be eligible 
members of the libertarian paradigm and Brudner sets out, but left-libertarians such as 
Hillel Steiner,16 Peter Vallentyne17 and Michael Otsuka18 or the conscience libertarian 
Chandran Kukathas19 would surely dispute this equation of libertarianism with the right-
libertarianism of Nozick and Hayek. The foundational commitments of these other 
libertarians are at odds with the foundations of Nozick and Hayek, as their quite 
opposed views on the origin and nature of property reveal. In portraying a liberal 
paradigm in terms of a particular partisan position, Brudner seems to neglect the 
competing and contradictory nature of the plural views of likely members of that 
paradigm. 
b) Can the Inclusive Conception Survive Complexity? 
The objection that Brudner has failed to recognise the competing and contradictory 
nature of the liberal paradigms seems to have one of two implications. Either, Brudner 
needs to provide a more convincing argument to other members of the paradigm of why 
one particular partisan view should be taken as definitive. For example, egalitarians are 
                                                 
16 Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights, (Oxford: Blackwells, 1994) 
17 Peter Vallentyne, ‘Libertarianism and the State’ (2007) 24 Social Philosophy and Policy at 187-
205 
18 Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) 
19 Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
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owed a stronger account of why luck egalitarianism should be taken as the essence of the 
egalitarian paradigm rather than strict egalitarianism or prioritarianism and so on. 
Perhaps this can be done. However, if it turns out that strict egalitarianism is in fact the 
essence of the egalitarian paradigm, or some other variant like prioritarianism, this has 
significant implications for his theory. The theory of constitutional goods depends on the 
account of the inclusive conception. If the members of the inclusive conception are 
different in substance, we would plausibly arrive at a different set of constitutional goods. 
So perhaps the form of theory would survive, but it would be necessarily different in 
substance, as the inclusive conception would be substantively different and alternate 
goods would be required to support such a different conception. A second implication is 
that once the diverse and contradictory nature of the liberal paradigms is recognised, the 
inclusive conception of liberalism becomes impossible. I have suggested that the notion 
of member liberal paradigm rests on the assumption that candidate positions can be 
reduced to certain thin commitments. I have argued above in reference to egalitarianism 
and libertarianism that even different members of the same family of liberal views are 
mutually exclusive. If the theoretical and normative premises of prioritarianism, strict 
egalitarianism, and luck egalitarianism are incompatible, there cannot be such doctrines 
as liberal paradigms. Consequently, the crucial notion of overlapping convergence on the 
inclusive conception cannot arise, as there are no paradigms which can converge. There 
are only multiple different contradictory egalitarianisms, libertarianisms, and 
communitarianisms. 
4. Liberal Paradigms and the Political/Comprehensive Distinction 
We saw earlier that one of Brudner’s objections to Rawls’s public justification of a 
political conception of justice was that Rawls denies the possibility of a principled 
agreement between the plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that will provide 
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stability and legitimacy for the liberal polity. Brudner proposes that liberal paradigms can 
converge on a consensus on the inclusive conception of liberalism. This convergence 
then allows each member paradigm to endorse the conception of justice from within 
their own doctrine, rather than from the perspective of an overlapping consensus on a 
freestanding political conception of justice. It seems clear that Brudner regards the liberal 
paradigms as kinds of comprehensive doctrines.  
Since, moreover, any philosophic agreement among liberalisms 
must be an agreement among liberal philosophies, we must also 
reopen the question whether a political conception of justice 
must be free-standing of all comprehensive moral views. Rawls 
insists that it must be, but nothing in the idea of a political 
conception, which is just a conception whose justification is 
directed to a limited audience, requires that it be detached from 
a comprehensive moral philosophy.20  
 Three questions arise from Brudner’s association of liberal paradigms with 
comprehensive doctrines: firstly, are they truly comprehensive; secondly, is Brudner’s 
convergent consensus comprehensive or political in nature; and thirdly, does Brudner’s 
conception of doctrines address the problem of reasonable pluralism? 
a) Are Liberal Paradigms Comprehensive Doctrines? 
Brudner’s portrayal of the libertarian, egalitarian, and communitarian liberal paradigms 
makes it clear that they are certainly broader than the political doctrines Rawls has in 
mind. A political doctrine, from Rawls’s point of view, is defined in terms of its object. 
In other words, a political doctrine is a doctrine regarding the political conception of 
justice that is concerned with principles that govern the fundamental institutions of 
                                                 
20 Bruder, Constitutional Goods at 10 
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society and their effects on stability, legitimacy, and the distribution of social goods. 
Comprehensive doctrines include both theoretical and practical philosophical 
commitments, that is views on such things as natural science, ontology, theology, and 
morality. These doctrines need not be set out in overtly philosophical terms, but they 
refer to a range of objects that exceed (although may also include) the boundaries of the 
basic structure of society. To fix the idea of comprehensive doctrines, we may suggest 
obvious candidates such as Roman Catholicism and secular humanism. Now it seems 
clear that the liberal paradigms that are members of the inclusive conception are not 
comprehensive in this manner. Libertarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarianism, as 
set out by Brudner, do not include metaphysical, ontological, or theological 
commitments (at least not integrally). Brudner might respond that whilst they are not 
fully comprehensive, they are not strictly political views and are far more philosophical 
(by which he seems to imply comprehensive in nature) in their commitments. As 
evidence, he may point to his discussions of the conception of the person in 
libertarianism, the commitments to views on choice and responsibility in egalitarianism, 
and society and culture in communitarianism. However, as Rawls points out in The 
Independence of Moral Theory,21 philosophical commitments to notions of causality and 
conceptions of the person and society are independent of practical questions of morality 
and politics. They are independent in the sense that any given conception of personal 
identity or causality or social formation is compatible with a diverse range of moral 
theories such as perfectionism, utilitarianism, Kantian constructivism, and intuitionism. 
And so it is not the libertarian’s conception of the person, or the egalitarian’s conception 
of causality, or the communitarian’s conception of social formation that grounds their 
particular moral and political commitments. These particular moral and political 
                                                 
21 John Rawls, ‘The Independence of Moral Theory’ (1974 - 1975) 48 Proceedings and Addresses 
of the American Philosophical Association at 5-22   
 20 
commitments are grounded on responses to practical moral and political questions, and 
draw on reasons and values that relate to these practical and not theoretical problems. 
Therefore, whilst Brudner is no doubt correct that the libertarian paradigm, the 
egalitarian paradigm, and the communitarian paradigm take positions on certain broader 
philosophical issues, these philosophical positions are not constitutive of these 
paradigms, but are philosophically independent of them. We can therefore argue that the 
various liberal paradigms are not comprehensive or philosophical in the sense of which 
Rawls is concerned with comprehensive doctrines.  
b) Is the Convergent Consensus Comprehensive or Political? 
One of Brudner’s aims in Constitutional Goods is to present an account of the justification 
of the ideal liberal constitution that is neither formal nor partisan, both of which qualities 
threaten Rawls’s Political Liberalism. The justification of the ideal liberal constitution 
proposed by Brudner aims to show how the broad philosophical commitments of the 
liberal paradigms may converge on an inclusive conception and therefore find grounds to 
justify a liberal conception of justice from within their particular liberal paradigms. We 
have seen that Brudner characterises this as a convergent consensus of liberal 
philosophies on a non-freestanding conception of justice. I have just argued that the 
liberal philosophies as set out by Brudner are not truly comprehensive. They are political 
conceptions, because the object of their reasons and values is political. Their reasons 
refer to the rules and authorities that, in the paradigm’s view, should govern political 
interactions. In the case of libertarianism these rules include the impermissibility of the 
violation of private property; in the case of egalitarianism, the authority of individual 
reason in making independent choices with sufficient resources; and in the case of 
communitarianism, the authority of corporate associations. The object of these rules, 
values, and authorities is political because it concerns the nature of political rights and 
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the goods of association. Even the discussion of the role of religion in the ideal liberal 
constitution is treated in its guise as a constitutional good, not as a salvific or redemptive 
good.22 It seems then that the kind of consensus that Brudner achieves through his 
portrayal of liberal paradigms and their convergence on the inclusive conception is 
political and not comprehensive or philosophical as he suggests. Is Brudner’s conception 
freestanding also? 
 Rawls describes his political conception as freestanding because it does not rely 
on any particular comprehensive view for its constitution and justification. Its content 
and justification is explicable in terms internal to the political conception of justice itself, 
which means that its object and the reasons that justify it are political, and not 
metaphysical, ontological, or theological. The conception of justice that Brudner 
proposes, which is constituted by the convergent consensus on the inclusive conception 
of liberalism, seems similarly freestanding. It is certainly true that the different liberal 
paradigms are mutually constitutive of the inclusive conception, so it is clearly not 
freestanding of them. But as I have suggested above, these liberal paradigms are political 
and not comprehensive doctrines themselves. The inclusive conception, as portrayed by 
Brudner, is freestanding of Roman Catholicism or secular humanism. It is freestanding 
of transcendental idealism, moral realism, historical materialism, or any other 
metaphysical, metaethical, or sociological position one might suggest. Thus, if the liberal 
paradigms are political and not comprehensive doctrines, and if the consensus is likewise 
political and freestanding, Brudner’s success in presenting a justification of the ideal 
liberal constitution that is at once philosophical and not freestanding, seems 
questionable. This doubt in turn raises the problem of the stability and legitimacy of the 
ideal liberal constitution. 
                                                 
22 Brudner, Constitutional Goods at 183-4 
 22 
c) Constitutional Goods and the Problem of Reasonable Pluralism 
Rawls argues that one of the primary reasons he developed a political conception of 
justice as fairness was his recognition of the phenomena of reasonable pluralism in liberal 
societies. Rawls’s claims that the exercise of reason under conditions of freedom will 
produce a variety of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and that these cannot serve as 
the basis for a justification of a conception of justice. Rawls’s arguments, as mentioned 
throughout this paper, turn on the notion that a conception of justice that is justified by 
Roman Catholics in virtue of Roman Catholic doctrine will not prove stable in a society 
composed of atheists, Buddhists, protestants, and so on. In the preceding discussion, I 
have argued that Brudner’s characterisation of the justification of the ideal liberal 
constitution amounts to a public justification of a political conception of justice that is 
freestanding of comprehensive doctrines. A serious consequence of these arguments is 
that Brudner is now faced with the problem of providing an account of how his theory 
of justice and justification addresses the problem of reasonable pluralism. Brudner seems 
to have two options before him. The first would be to accept the thrust of these 
arguments and embrace a kind of public justification on the basis of public reason and 
the burdens of justice. The second would be to deny the phenomena of reasonable 
pluralism, or deny that the justification of the ideal liberal constitution is meant to 
address reasonable comprehensive views that fall outside the inclusive conception of 
liberalism. It seems to me that the relative costs weigh heavily in favour of the first 
option, as Brudner’s concern with the portrayal of an ideal liberal constitution that 
embodies the constitutional goods he proposes can be recast in terms of a freestanding 
political conception of justice. The costs of the second option are to present a defence of 
the ideal liberal constitution that cannot provide the basis for a stable and legitimate 
polity in conditions of reasonable pluralism. However, even if Brudner adopts the 
second strategy, two further problems remain in his account of the justification of the 
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ideal liberal constitution that threaten his proposed constitutional order, namely: the 
epistemology of a convergent consensus, and the reasonableness of the inclusive 
conception. 
5. Indeterminacy, Burdens of Judgment, and the Convergent Consensus 
We recall that Brudner characterised Rawls’s view of an overlapping consensus as 
involving a commitment to the indeterminacy of judgment. Brudner claimed that Rawls’s 
notion of an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice was informed by 
the view that the burdens of judgment prevent agreement on the basis of any particular 
comprehensive doctrine. The burdens of judgment argument was derived from the view 
that due to imperfect information, subjective preference weighting, and the fuzziness of 
many moral and political concepts, judgment is necessarily indeterminate. As a 
consequence of the indeterminacy of judgment, agreement amongst reasonable citizens 
involves a commitment to the necessary constraints of the burdens on judgment.23 But 
Brudner argues that the problem of the indeterminacy of judgment and therefore the 
commitment to the burdens of judgment can be avoided by adopting an alternative view 
of judgment where the conception of justice of each liberal paradigm is compared to a 
constitutional whole based entirely on that conception (what Brudner calls the concept 
of public reason). When a libertarian constitution fails to provide the kind of just order a 
libertarian themselves would accept, the argument moves to the next conception 
(egalitarianism) in order to remedy the problems with the concept of a libertarian 
constitution, and so on to communitarianism. However, there seem to be two problems 
with Brudner’s discussion of judgement and the kind of consensus that follows: firstly, 
that Rawls’s view is not based on the indeterminacy of judgment; and secondly, that 
Brudner’s understanding of judgment allows of no consensus. 
                                                 
23 Reasonable agreement also involves a commitment to an agreement on the basis of reasons 
and values that are authoritative to all. We will consider this point in the next section. 
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a) Indeterminacy and Inconclusivity in Judgment 
Gerald Gaus points out ‘…talk of “indeterminacy” can easily lead us astray. 
Indeterminacy and inconclusiveness are distinct; a great deal of trouble is avoided if we 
see this clearly.’24 Indeterminacy applies to judgments where there are no grounds to 
accept or reject a belief or proposition (). Inconclusiveness applies to judgments where 
there are grounds to accept of reject , but these grounds are open to a degree of doubt 
or uncertainty due to lack of perfect information etc, and are therefore defeasible. As 
Gaus argues, this distinction points to a common intuitive difference in the use of these 
terms.25 It should be clear from this distinction that Rawls’s burdens of judgment 
argument is derived from a view that judgments about reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines are inconclusive, certainly when applied to political questions. His view is not 
that these comprehensive doctrines are subject to the burden of indeterminacy. Indeed, it 
is as important feature of the reasonableness of a comprehensive doctrine that there be 
good grounds from within the doctrine for its adoption: 
…a reasonable doctrine is an exercise of theoretical reason: it 
covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of 
human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner… 
It organises and characterizes recognized values so that they are 
compatible with one another and express an intelligible view of 
the world… it tends to evolve slowly in the light of what, from 
its point of view, it sees as good and sufficient reasons.26 
 The burdens of judgment are not therefore a result of the indeterminacy of 
judgment, but rather the inconclusivity of judgment. We might think that this is a mere 
                                                 
24 Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 152, see also 
Micah Swartzman, ‘The Completeness of Public Reason’ (2004) 3 Politics, Philosophy, and 
Economics at 191-220 for employment of this distinction in defence of public reason. 
25 Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism at 153 
26 Rawls, Political Liberalism at 59 
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terminological difference between Brudner and Rawls, and that Brudner’s point remains 
if we swap the notion of indeterminate for inconclusive. However, even if this point can 
be addressed by terminological adjustment, there seems to me two reasons why Brudner 
cannot avoid the force of Rawls’s burdens of judgment argument as fully as he suggests.  
Firstly, Brudner’s rejection of the burdens of judgment argument is derived from 
his rejection, or at least side-stepping, of the problem of indeterminacy. I have just 
argued that the burdens of judgment argument is derived from the problem of 
inconclusivity, and not indeterminacy.  If Brudner believes that the inconclusivity ground 
can likewise be rejected or side-stepped, what does this mean for the status of the 
judgments that underpin the liberal paradigms and the inclusive conception? Are these 
immune from the burdens of judgment? Are there conclusive reasons to hold to 
libertarianism, egalitarianism, or communitarianism? Surely not, as these are superseded 
by the inclusive conception, and therefore each independently is subject to a qualification 
on its reasons, and therefore its reasons are neither conclusive nor indefeasible. If the 
liberal paradigms are not free of the burdens of judgment, perhaps the inclusive 
conception is. This seems more likely to be Brudner’s position, but the implication of 
this is that there is no qualification on the justification of the inclusive conception. None 
of the reasons, beliefs, information, and weightings are inconclusive. This seems an 
implausibly high standard of justification for any conception of justice to attain. This 
objection to Brudner’s position rests on the view that by conflating indeterminacy with 
inconclusivity, he has failed to show that the burdens of judgment do not apply. But 
perhaps Brudner need not meet this objection directly, but merely offer an alternative 
account of judgment that is superior. This he offers in his account of dialectical 
reasoning as an alternative to Rawls’s account of judgment.  
My second reason to doubt that Brudner can avoid the burdens of judgment 
argument is derived from the possibility of a public justification of a political conception 
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of justice on the basis of dialectical reasoning. One of the conditions of Rawls’s public 
reason, as constrained by the burdens of judgment, is that the modes of argumentation 
must be publicly accessible and not esoteric or controversial. Brudner gives an overview 
of dialectical reasoning in relation to libertarianism: 
We do not ask, for example, whether cold mutual respect 
accords with (is an instance of) public reason as we understand 
it; rather, we ask whether it is public reason according to 
libertarianims’s own understanding of that concept as 
excluding subjective preferences. And the answer depends on 
whether the conception of public reason as mutual cold respect 
conforms, when realized, to libertarianism’s own understanding 
of what a public reason is or whether it dissolves into what it 
takes to be the opposite of a public reason. Here, therefore, it 
is not we who judge externally that the conception is deficient; 
it is rather the conception that reveals itself as deficient by its 
own standards just in the process of realizing itself. This, of 
course, is the kind of thinking that Plato and Hegel called 
dialectic…27 
 Can such an account of reasoning provide a basis for a public justification of the 
ideal liberal constitution? Rawls takes the view that modes of argumentation must be 
accessible to all in order for a just polity to be stable and legitimate. It seems to me that 
one hallmark of the kind of accessible thinking Rawls has in mind is that there is at least 
expert consensus on its nature and limits. This would apply to scientific reasoning, the 
methodology of which is well established, taught to children in schools, and part of the 
public discourse of media and politics. We can think of other modes that are similarly 
                                                 
27 Brudner, Constitutional Goods at 432 
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accessible and well established such as basic inferential, syllogistic, and deductive modes 
of reasoning. However, dialectical reasoning seems to me on a par with transcendental 
reasoning, or quantum logic. These modes of reasoning are historically well established, 
and subject of serious research programmes, but they are also highly contested and far 
from accepted as appropriate modes of public argumentation. Perhaps dialectical 
reasoning is much more common sense than I have suggested, and I confuse 
philosophical controversy with public controversy. In which case, dialectical reasoning 
may be allowed as a basis for public justification of the ideal liberal constitution. 
However, even if dialectical reasoning is an appropriate basis for public justification, it 
seems to me that it cannot provide the basis for a consensus of any kind, whether 
overlapping or convergent, because it does not provide the basis for an agreement 
between the paradigms. 
b) Consensus and Exclusion 
Brudner argues for a convergent consensus over an overlapping consensus. We have 
seen that the basis for this argument is the view that the overlapping consensus is based 
on an inappropriate model of judgment, and that it will collapse into a modus vivendi. 
Brudner is nevertheless committed to the view that justification of the ideal liberal 
constitution relies on consensus. The convergent consensus, as set out by Brudner, 
involves each liberal paradigm, through a process of dialectical reasoning, converging on 
the inclusive conception of liberalism as the fullest and most coherent conception of 
justice that provides each conception with its full realization. Brudner presents a deeply 
impressive dialectic from which the inclusive conception is produced. But it seems to me 
that this dialectical reasoning cannot produce a consensus. A consensus involves a 
mutual acceptance of the justificatory efficacy of certain reasons, beliefs, evidence etc. 
Brudner disagrees that consensus will be overlapping between a plurality of reasonable 
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comprehensive views on a freestanding conception of justice, but he still aspires to a 
consensus between liberal paradigms on the inclusive conception. However, as Brudner 
has described the dialectical process of justification, it seems as if each liberal paradigm 
finds reasons for acceptance of the inclusive conception that are internal to their own 
conception. As quoted above, Brudner describes this as a process of self-comparison28 
where it is ‘…the conception that reveals itself as deficient by its own standards just in 
the process of realizing itself.’29 However, whilst Brudner might have successfully shown 
how, through a process of dialectical reasoning, a libertarian can find the inclusive 
conception justified qua fulfilment of the libertarian paradigm (and so on for the other 
liberal conceptions), it doesn’t seem as though any of the paradigms finds the inclusive 
conception justified on shared grounds. The egalitarian does not find the inclusive 
conception justified on the basis of the same reasons, beliefs, values, and evidence that 
the libertarian or communitarian finds them justified. This is because the egalitarian’s 
dialectical justification refers to the incomplete realization of the ideal liberal constitution 
in an egalitarian constitution.  The inclusive conception of liberalism is justified to the 
egalitarian because it realizes egalitarianism fully. There is no convergence of 
justifications between libertarians, egalitarians, and communitarians because each liberal 
paradigm provides its own exclusive justification. The libertarian does not find the 
inclusive conception justified because of its fulfilment of the egalitarian conception. We 
might explain the point formally: Brudner’s argument states: D  A’  B’  C’ where D 
is the convergent consensus on the overlapping consensus, and where A’, B’, and C’ 
represent the libertarian, egalitarian, and communitarian liberal paradigms respectively, as 
adjusted by the process of dialectical reasoning,  is conjunction, and  is equivalence. 
However, according to my argument above: A’  B’  C’ where  stands for the 
                                                 
28 ibid. at 431 
29 ibid. at 432 
 29 
exclusive disjunction ‘or, but not both.’ This represents the argument that the particular 
liberal paradigms justify the inclusive conception on their own terms (according the 
model of dialectical reasoning) and that each cannon of justification presented by a 
particular paradigm excludes the others because it draws on reasons and values that are at 
odds with the other liberal paradigms. We recall that in section 4 I argued that a 
convergent consensus is unlikely because member liberal paradigms of the inclusive 
conception are composed of mutually exclusive doctrines, and there is no such thing as a 
coherent libertarian, egalitarian, or communitarian paradigm. There are therefore no 
liberal paradigms that can converge. My argument against the possibility of a convergent 
consensus may therefore be summarised formally as: D  {A1  A2  A3}  {B1  B 2  
B3}  {C1  C2  C3} where A1 is left-libertarianism, A2 is right-libertarianism, and A3 is 
conscience-libertarianism, repeated for the other variants in the egalitarian and 
communitarian paradigms. This means that the convergent consensus (D  A’  B’  
C’) is impossible.30 Brudner may respond that the convergent consensus is merely a 
model for the kind of relationship that exists between the different liberal paradigms in 
the inclusive conception, and that it does not require that they find the ideal liberal 
constitution justified on the same grounds as each other, but that they find the same 
conception justified, according to their own reasons and values. But this seems to 
amount to a modus vivendi. One of the differences between a modus vivendi and consensus 
as principled agreement, is that a modus vivendi is an agreement based on a coordination of 
separate interests, whereas consensus is an agreement on shared reasons and values. A 
modus vivendi is in this respect a contract on the basis of mutual advantage, and not a 
contract on the basis of fairness and reciprocity.31 If, as I have argued, the various liberal 
paradigms do not find the ideal liberal constitution justified as a result of a convergence 
                                                 
30 Thank to Conrad Heilmann for discussion on this point. 
31 see Rawls, Political Liberalism at 16-17 
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on a consensus of reasons and values, but rather find the ideal liberal constitution 
justified because of a coordination of separate interests, then Brudner’s account of 
convergent consensus seems more susceptible to a collapse into modus vivendi than does 
Rawls’s. 
6. Brudner’s Unreasonable Agreement: Publicity, Reciprocity, and Fairness  
I have argued above that Brudner’s account of a convergent consensus rests on the view 
that each member paradigm of the inclusive conception of liberalism agrees to the 
conception of justice for reasons particular to each conception. I claimed that this 
amounted to a modus vivendi rather than a principled consensus. One of the implications 
of this argument is that the justification lacks important moral elements that are included 
in Rawls’s notion of reasonableness, namely fairness and publicity.32 The notion of 
fairness is expressed in Rawls’s view that citizens are motivated to seek agreement on 
terms of cooperation that are reciprocally acceptable to all; the notion of publicity is 
expressed in Rawls’s view that assurance of fairness as the basis of agreement should be 
expressed publically.  
The notion of fairness has two important dimensions: firstly that the citizens are 
motivated to engage in cooperative political and social relationships, and secondly that 
the principles that govern these relationships are justified to the extent that all 
cooperators regard them as fair. In other words, the principles are known to all, the 
mode of reasoning is accessible to all, and the values and justifications are shared by all. 
There is no appeal to any interest or source of reasoning that cannot be shared by all 
                                                 
32 Rawls says that reasonableness has two aspects ‘…the willingness to propose fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them provided others do. The second basic aspect… is the 
willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of 
public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.’ 
ibid., at 54. Having considered the burdens of judgment argument, we are now considering the 
fairness argument. 
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cooperators. Rawls describes this as the point of view of you and me, which is distinct 
from one of altruism or mutual advantage.33 Stephen Darwall has recently characterised 
this relationship as the second-person standpoint.34 A first-person reason is one that is 
based on the particular agent-relative interests of an individual, a third-person reason is 
based on agent-neutral considerations (such as aggregate welfare), whilst ‘[a] second-
personal reason is one whose validity depends on the presupposed authority and 
accountability relations between persons and, therefore, on the possibility of the reason’s 
being addressed person-to-person.’35 This matches Rawls’s view that ‘[r]easonable 
persons, we say, are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a 
social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with other on terms all can 
accept. They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits 
along with others.’36 
Publicity is a dimension of reasonableness because it embodies mutual respect. 
Publicity embodies mutual respect because it shows that we value reciprocity in 
justification. Reciprocity in justification means that we expect others to openly and 
publically provide assurance that they endorse the agreement on the basis of shared 
reasons and values, and that we believe others are entitled to have assurance of our 
endorsement on these grounds. ‘Insofar as we are reasonable, we are ready to work out 
the framework for the public social world, a framework it is reasonable to expect 
everyone to endorse and act on, provided others can be relied on to do the same.’37 The 
public justification of a political conception of justice that is based on an overlapping 
consensus between reasonable citizens is a justification from the second-person 
                                                 
33 ibid. at 70 
34 Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2006) 
35 ibid. at 8 
36 Rawls, Political Liberalism at 50 where the general good would be the third-person point of view 
37 ibid. at 54 
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standpoint. It refers to the authority of fair and public justification that applies over all 
reasonable citizens. This authority is grounded on principles and values that are 
recognised by all reasonable citizens on the same ground, and this reciprocal recognition 
itself provides part of the authority of these reasons.  
When we turn to Brudner’s rendering of the justification of the ideal liberal 
constitution, is it characterised by reasonableness in the same way? Does it include the 
values of fairness and publicity? It seems not. The justification of Brudner’s ideal liberal 
constitution is provided by reasons particular to each liberal paradigm, as described in the 
discussion of dialectical reasoning and convergent consensus above. This model of 
justification seems to track the notion of a first-person standpoint, rather than a second-
person standpoint. From the point of view of the libertarian, the egalitarian, and the 
communitarian, the ideal liberal constitution is justified because it realises most fully the 
moral commitments within each paradigm. The agreement is not constituted by fairness 
and publicity, because the reasons and values that justify the constitution are not shared. 
As there are no shared reasons, their authority cannot be second-personal, in the sense 
that they are mutually authoritative reasons. Consequently, a crucial element of the liberal 
notion of justice, namely fairness and the second-person standpoint, is absent from 
Brudner’s account. Therefore, the very account of justice embodied in the inclusive 
conception and the ideal liberal constitution, seems incompatible with the value of 
fairness that underlies the notion of a reciprocal justification of the authority of the 
conception. Absent fairness, we may ask what kind of justice and what kind of 
justification does Constitutional Goods provide? I have argued that even if problems with 
the possibility of agreement and consensus are overcome, the justification lacks the value 
of fairness and reasonableness. These values animate a liberal conception of justice, and 
many liberals will find any conception of justice that omits them less than ideal. 
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Conclusion 
Brudner’s conception of justice and justification is presented in large part in opposition 
to Rawls’s political liberalism. I have argued that his suggested alternative of an inclusive 
conception of liberalism composed of dialectically refined liberal paradigms converging 
on a consensus is problematic. My most serious objections are that an inclusive 
conception may in fact be impossible, and even if the problems I raise can be 
surmounted, the agreement would not be characterised by the value of fairness. Such an 
agreement would amount to a modus vivendi and not a principled agreement on the basis 
of a shared commitment to the liberal confidence. Lacking fairness and consensus, 
Brudner’s ideal liberal constitution seems unjustified.  
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